Dual-class shares in Singapore – Where ideology meets pragmatism by LEE, Pey Woan
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law 
12-2018 
Dual-class shares in Singapore – Where ideology meets 
pragmatism 
Pey Woan LEE 
Singapore Management University, pwlee@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research 




This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an 
authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, 
please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
 1 
[Pre-Print Draft. Publication Citation: 15 Berkeley Business Law Journal 440 (2019)]  
 
 
Dual-Class Shares in Singapore – Where Ideology Meets Pragmatism 
 




Dual class share (“DCS”) structures are a type of governance structure that deviates from the 
standard one share, one vote (“OSOV”) structure. They occur when a company issues two 
classes of shares with the same economic entitlements but different voting rights, thus 
creating a wedge between voting and cash flow rights. Because a DCS structure could vest 
control in the hands of a minority, it is often thought to be inherently unfair and 
objectionable. That notwithstanding, DCS structures have long been a familiar feature of 
American and European markets.  In Asia, however, the idea is still relatively novel as 
concentrated shareholdings are more commonly achieved through pyramid structures and 
cross holdings.  
 
In Singapore, the principle of proportionality—that voting power should correlate to 
economic interest—has for the most part of its young history been an entrenched feature of 
the nation’s regulatory framework. Companies with DCS structures are not therefore 
permitted to list on the Singapore Exchange. But that is set to change as the Singapore 
Exchange has recently confirmed its decision to introduce a new framework for DCS 
listings.1 Unsurprisingly, this development has sparked controversy. Detractors have 
criticized it as a lamentable step that will trigger “a race to the bottom”.2 Supporters, on the 
other hand, see it as a “progressive step forward to keep pace with global markets”,3 justified 




* Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I am grateful to Umakanth Varottil, Dan 
Puchniak, Sang Yop Kang, Li XingXing, David Zaring, Wang Jiangyu and Zhang Wei for their helpful 
comments at the NUS-SMU-Berkeley Comparative Corporate Governance Conference 2018. I would also like 
to thank Wee Meng Seng for reading and commenting on the paper, and Ernest Tan En Jie, Timothy Tan 
Ziming and Thia Zhang Jie for their research assistance. All errors remain my sole responsibility. 
1 Cai Haoxiang, Singapore Introducing Dual Class Shares, Straits Times, Jan. 20, 2018.  
2 David Smith, Singapore Risks a Race to the Bottom with Dual Class Shares, Financial Times, Mar. 16, 2017. 
3 Lance Lim, Dual Class Shares in Singapore, Singapore Law Gazette, Apr. 2017, at 28.  
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This article seeks to understand the rationale for and potential implications of this 
development. It does so by first considering the theoretical as well as evidential arguments 
for and against the use of DCS, followed by a survey on the reception (or otherwise) of such 
structures in four common law jurisdictions with vibrant capital markets, viz., Canada, the 
United States, United Kingdom and Hong Kong. It observes that the chief argument cited by 
business founders to justify the use of DCS structures is the desire to enhance a firm’s long-
term profitability by shielding the (talented) founder from short-term market pressures. 
Though the use of DCS structures remains controversial, the phenomenal success of 
technology unicorns such as Alphabet Inc. and Alibaba appears (for now) to have sealed the 
place of DCS in the American securities markets. This exerts considerable pressure on 
competing markets to follow suit. Singapore’s response to this aggressive competition is 
pragmatic but measured. The indications so far are that the regulators would chart a middle 
path between the conflicting goals of incentivizing entrepreneurial fundraising and investor 
protection by permitting DCS structures in exceptional cases circumscribed by stringent 
safeguards. This, it is submitted, is an appropriate response given the theoretical and 
evidential underpinnings of DCS structures as well as economic and regulatory conditions 
peculiar to Singapore. Should it succeed, this development would serve as an interesting and 
notable example of a regulatory innovation that avoids the proverbial race to the bottom in 
the face of intense competition. 
  
 
1. THE CONTROVERSY 
  
A. The Theoretical Debate 
 
In modern economies, the OSOV principle is widely regarded as the bedrock of sound 
corporate governance. Leading markets such as those of London4 and Hong Kong5 explicitly 
endorse the principle in their regulatory regime to underscore the importance of fair and 
equal treatment of shareholders. At the theoretical level, Easterbrook and Fischel present the 
classic justification of the principle,6 arguing that shareholders, as residual claimants, have 
the strongest incentives to maximize firm value. The OSOV rule is a logical consequence of 
 
4 FCA Handbook, LR 7.2.1A, Principle 3. 
5 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, Main Board Listing Rule 8.11. But this is also set to change, see 
discussion in text accompanying infra, notes 105 – 117. 
6 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & Econ. 395, 409 (1983). 
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that function because shareholders are most likely to make optimal decisions when their gains 
(or losses) are proportionate to their investments in the company. Disproportionate voting, on 
the other hand, leads to increased agency costs as it distorts the incentives for decision-
making. A super-voting minority may take more risks than are optimal because it has 
(proportionately) less to lose if the risk materializes. For modern corporations typified by the 
separation of ownership and control, the OSOV principle is all the more imperative because it 
enhances voting as a monitoring mechanism.7 Where the managers underperform, 
shareholders may vote to remove them.8 By vesting the right to transfer control on majority 
equity owners, the OSOV rule ensures the decision is made by those most likely to act 
optimally. By contrast, dual class share structures may impede optimal transfers by allowing 
an insider-minority to entrench themselves, particularly by blocking value-enhancing 
takeover bids. On this view, the OSOV rule is crucial to good corporate governance as it 
facilitates optimal decisions and promotes managerial accountability. Deviations from the 
rule weaken the governance framework by heightening the risks of expropriation and 
entrenchment. 
 
Although shareholder vote is an important means of containing agency costs, its effectiveness 
is limited by problems of collective action.9 This occurs when a corporation has diffused 
shareholding such that the holding of each shareholder is too small to justify the high cost of 
monitoring activities. The result is shareholder apathy and passivity, with decision-making 
left in the hands of either a small controlling minority or management. In their thesis, 
Easterbrook and Fischel recognize that problems of collective action undermine shareholder 
primacy, but they also observe that such problems may be overcome by the aggregation of 
shares, for those holding a sizeable block of shares (such as institutional investors) would, by 
reason of their economic exposure, have sufficient incentive to monitor management 
performance.10 To that end, proponents of OSOV argue that the principle remains significant 
as it optimizes shareholders’ capacity to amass control. Unequal voting structures, on the 
other hand, are likely to exacerbate collective action problems since the more the votes vested 
 
7 Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Stocks 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 136 
(1987). 
8 The right to remove and elect board members is arguably the most fundamental of shareholder rights: see 
Julian Valesco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 416 – 417 (2006). 
9 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 79, (rev. ed. 
1967).  
10 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, 402 and 406.  
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in (minority) insiders, the more the votes needed to defeat their proposals.11 The increased 
costs of organizing and coordinating collective action of a large(r) group of dispersed 
shareholders also renders shareholder opposition more arduous, further deterring shareholder 
activism and aggravating apathy.12 However, the cogency of these arguments is limited to the 
context of “horizontal conflicts”—typically cases of minority oppression where different 
groups of shareholders are battling each other.13 In the distinct context of takeover offers, 
where shareholders are required to collectively confront an outside party (the acquiror), a 
dual class structure may be optimal because it creates a controlling group that could 
overcome the problems of collective action to extract higher takeover premia from the 
acquiror.14 Context is therefore important when evaluating the merits of DCS structures. 
 
Another limitation of Easterbrook and Fischel’s thesis concerns its assumption of shareholder 
homogeneity—that shareholders are best placed to maximize firm value because they are “a 
reasonably homogeneous group with respect to their desires for the firm” whose preferences 
can be aggregated to “form a consistent system of choices”.15  Grant Hayden and Matthew 
Bodie have persuasively demonstrated that this assumption is flawed.16 In their view,17 
 
Shareholders are not the homogenous share-value maximizers that the “one share, one 
vote” theory envisions. Instead, shareholders are likely to have a variety of interests that 
can potentially compete with their interests as shareholders. 
 
Thus, majority shareholders may differ from the minority in preferring decisions that advance 
their own interests at the expense of the minority; shareholders who have effectively hedged 
against downside risks may be indifferent to or even support a fall in stock price; employee-
shareholders may be more concerned with protecting their employment than maximizing firm 
value; and institutional shareholders such as sovereign wealth and pension funds may invest 
 
11 Jeffrey Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 
C.L.R. 1, 45 – 46 (1998); Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, St John’s L. Rev. 863, 907 – 909 
(1984). 
12 Gorden, supra note 11, 46. 
13 Indeed, it has been observed that the notion of shareholder primacy and the related notion of “one share, one 
vote” were generated primarily to resolve such horizontal conflicts: see Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, 
“One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity” (2008) 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 445, 
480. 
14 Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee, One Share – One Vote: The Theory, 12 Rev. Fin. 1, 3 and 29 (2008).  
15 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, 405. 
16 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 13. 
17 Id. 449.   
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with a view to advancing specific national or institutional agenda. Moreover, the term 
“wealth maximization” is inherently vague since shareholders with divergent time horizons 
are likely to conceive of firm value differently. While a short-term investor would vote to 
maximize short-term gains, the long-term investor may prefer to hold out for long-term 
appreciation. The narrow focus on maximizing financial wealth also fails to recognize that 
some shareholders may prize other values over financial gain. The rise in sustainable 
investment,18 for instance, suggests that a sizeable proportion of investors are committed to 
maximizing profits within the strictures of desired environmental, social, and governance 
goals. Therefore, far from being homogenous, shareholders are a heterogeneous group that 
seek to optimize a variety of interests beyond their residual interests in the firm.19 
Consequently, shareholders do not invariably have the strongest incentive to maximize firm 
value and hence the case for maintaining the OSOV principle is correspondingly weakened.20  
 
The fact that the OSOV principle may not appear as sacrosanct as it is commonly assumed is 
not, of course, a sufficient reason for permitting disproportionate share structures. Supporters 
of DCS typically point, instead, to various benefits as justifications for such structures. First, 
it is said that unequal voting structures may be efficient if insiders value control more than 
outside shareholders.21 Allowing differentiated voting structures may therefore optimize 
social value as more votes may be granted to those who value them more. Second, 
consolidated voting control may increase a firm’s value by inducing its managers to invest in 
firm-specific human capital.22 This refers to skills and knowledge that are of value only for a 
particular firm, which managers would not be incentivized to acquire unless they are assured 
of continued employment by the company. Enabling insiders to hold superior-voting shares is 
one means of encouraging such firm-specific investment.23 Third, DCS structures allow 
controlling shareholders and management to focus on the firm’s long-term profitability and 
 
18 The Global Sustainable Investment Alliance reported in 2016 that US$22.89 trillion assets were being 
managed under responsible investment strategies: see GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT ALLIANCE, GLOBAL 
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT REVIEW 2016, http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/GSIR_Review2016.F.pdf. 
19 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 13, 499 – 500. 
20 Indeed, Hayden and Bodie cite dual class shares as a settled instance of how the law has accommodated 
shareholders’ diverse interests: id. 481 – 482. 
21 Fischel, supra note 7, 136 – 137; Ashton, supra note 11, 872 and 928. 
22 Id. 137 – 138; Ashton, supra note 11, 929; Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of 
Voting Rights – A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Class Stock, 14 J. F. Econ. 33, 35 (1985); Burkart & 
Lee, supra note 14, 27.  
23 Ashton, supra note 11, 925. 
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success by shielding them from short-term market pressures.24 This, as we shall see below, is 
now the dominant justification for the adoption of dual class structures by technology 
companies.25 Fourth, dual class voting promotes entrepreneurial activities as it lowers the 
cost of acquiring control and facilitates risk-diversification.26 Entrepreneurs who wish to 
access the capital markets without relinquishing control (and who may not otherwise have the 
means to acquire a controlling equity stake) may achieve that by acquiring a minority stake 
with super-voting rights. At the same time, the lower cost of investment allows controllers to 
diversify their firm-specific investment by sharing some of the firm-specific risks with 
outside investors.27 Such diversification is ultimately beneficial not only to the insiders but 
also to society as a whole because diversified controllers are likely to pursue riskier 
investments that will increase the production of goods and services. Finally, it is well 
established that dual class structures are an effective anti-takeover mechanism. We have seen 
that this is a drawback of dual class structures insofar as it enables insiders to shield 
themselves from the discipline of the market and retain control, but it can also benefit 
shareholders when it is used primarily to fend off detrimental hostile bids.28  
 
In recent years, the popularity of DCS structures among high-growth technology companies 
has been justified chiefly on the need to maintain the long-term vision and control of the 
founders. For these companies, such control is seen as necessary to protect innovation and 
risk-taking from short-term market forces and risk-averse shareholders. For example, in 
defending Google’s29 DCS structure, Larry Page and Sergey Brin observed that “outside 
pressures too often tempt companies to sacrifice long-term opportunities to meet quarterly 
market expectations”.30 Likewise, Joe Tsai of Alibaba wrote in a blog post that the 
 
24 Id. 929; Thomas J. Chemmanur & Yawen Jiao, Dual Class IPOs: A Theoretical Analysis, 36 J. Banking & 
Fin. 305 (2012). 
25 See text accompany infra, notes 29– 33. 
26 Fischel, supra note 7, 139. 
27 Id; Ashton, supra note 11, 927 – 928. It has also been argued that restricting all firms to a OSOV structure 
may have “a distortionary effect on firms’ financing and investment decisions, or induces firms to resort to other 
means of separating ownership and control”: see Burkart & Lee, supra note 14, 30.  
28 Kishore EeChambadi, The Dual Class Voting Structure, Associated Agency Issue, and a Path Forward, 13 
N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 503, 517 (2017); Burkart & Lee, supra note 14, 26. Fischel explains this benefit in another 
way, by understanding insider control as a “signalling device” to communicate private information (as regards 
the firm’s value) to outsiders, thus decreasing the need for expending resources to convince potential bidders 
that the firm’s current use of assets is optimal: see Fischel, supra note 7, 138. 
29 Since restructured as a company wholly-owned by Alphabet Inc.: see Alphabet Inc., Current Report (Form 8-
K), (October 2, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000119312515336577/d82837d8k12b.htm. 
30 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (April 29, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm. 
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company’s disproportional voting structure31 was designed to ensure that management could 
“set the company’s strategic course without being influenced by the fluctuating attitudes of 
the capital markets so as to protect the long-term interests of our customers, company and all 
shareholders.”32 Outside the context of technology companies, this “preservation of founder 
ethos and values” rationale has also been invoked to rationalize the use of DCS in media (to 
maintain editorial integrity), fashion (to build brand equity closely associated with a founder) 
as well as employee-owned companies (to build high employee morale and increase 
productivity).33  
 
For advocates of DCS structures, the unparalleled success of companies such as Google, 
Facebook, and Alibaba stands as irrefutable evidence that disproportional voting structures 
can and do—when coupled with visionary leadership—enhance rather than destroy share 
value. Critics, however, argue that the “visionary founder” justification is no more than “a 
quixotic notion fed to public investors that allows an escape from shareholder 
accountability”.34 After all, examples of outstanding single-class stock companies abound—
Microsoft, Amazon, Twitter and Netflix are some that come to mind—and these have not 
needed heightened founder control to prosper. Even if a founder were particularly talented 
and committed such that her entrenchment at the time of IPO seemed right, there is no 
guarantee that that will always be the case.35 Her priorities may change, or she may depart or 
decease. If, as is often the case, her successor is less capable, a DCS structure will more 
likely be used as a shield against market discipline than to protect the company’s long-term 
interests.36 Viewed in that light, the DCS structure is, ironically, no less a form of short-
 
31 Alibaba did not adopt a typical dual class structure that comprises two or more classes of shares with different 
voting rights. Instead, it instituted a “partnership” comprising the company’s leading executives to appoint a 
majority of the company’s directors. In addition, the company also adopted a series of anti-takeover provisions 
in its Articles of Association that make it practically impossible for public shareholders to alter the nomination 
rights of the founders.  Commentators have labelled this as a form of “extreme corporate governance” that 
creates an even larger discrepancy between cash-flow rights and control rights than the typical dual-class 
structure: see Yu-Hsin Lin and Thomas Mehaffy, Open Sesame: The Myth of Alibaba’s Extreme Corporate 
Governance and Control, 10 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. Law 437, 456 (2016).  
32 See blog post of Joe Tsai, Alibaba Offers an Alternative View of Good Corporate Governance, ALIZILA, 
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.alizila.com/alibaba-offers-an-alternative-view-of-good-corporate-governance/.  
33 Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating the Pros and Cons of Dual Class Capital Structures, 
27 Insights; The Corporate and Securities Law Advisor 10 at 12 (2013). 
34 EeChambadi, supra note 28, 515, citing Andrew Sorkin, Stock Split for Google That Cements Control at the 
Top, N.Y. Times DEALBOOK (Apr. 16, 2012).  
35 As Sorkin (id.) wrote, “Just think about other once highflying technology companies that turned sour. Yahoo. 
Or Research in Motion. Its founders were once lionized as visionaries — until they weren’t. The problem is that 
Google will succeed until it doesn’t. And when it falters, it won’t have the kick in the pants that the prospect of 
pressure from shareholders can provide.”  
36 Chemmanur & Jiao, supra note 24, 306 (postulating that “while talented managers may create considerable 
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termism.37 At the very least, concerns over succession would suggest that even if DCS 
structures were to be permitted, the case for their perpetual continuation is tenuous.38  
 
More fundamentally, these objections are concerned with the risk of expropriation by the 
controlling minority to the detriment of other shareholders.39  The argument, as explained,40 
is that DCS structures undermine the function of shareholders as a monitoring mechanism, 
leading to increased extraction of private benefits. To this, the standard rejoinder of DCS 
advocates is that the market (being efficient) would itself be able to regulate such risks as 
investors would be able to anticipate the extent of private benefit extraction and discount the 
stock price accordingly.41 There is, in other words, a “price at which prospective investors are 
willing to accept any negative firm characteristics, including agency costs, bad corporate 
governance and so forth”.42 That being the case, private ordering (which is the general 
preference of corporate law) should prevail so companies can be free to select the capital 
structure that best suits their needs, and investors can choose between shares with different 
control rights.43 The problem with this reasoning, however, is that it assumes that investors 
are able to accurately price the inferior-voting shares at the time of purchase (usually upon 
IPO). In reality, investors’ judgment may be impeded by information asymmetry (both at the 
point of IPO and subsequently), and the assessment of underwriters may not be reliable as 
they are susceptible to being “captive” of issuers.44 The risk of unfair expropriation by the 
controlling minority therefore remains.  
 
shareholder value by focusing on value maximization, the average CEO may not be able to do so, but would 
instead use this insulation from the disciplining effect of the takeover market to slack off and enjoy the 
perquisites of control.”) Wen cites the example of Rupert and James Murdoch, who were able to retain their 
positions as heads of News Corp despite having been implicated in criminal investigations for phone hacking: 
see Tien Wen, You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-Class Stock Companies from 
Listing on the Securities Exchange, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1495, 1502 (2014). See also Lin & Mehaffy, supra note 
31, 469 – 470. 
37 James Kristie, Dual-Class Stock: Governance at the Edge, Directors and Boards, Third Quarter 2012 at 38. 
38 See generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 
Va. L. Rev. 585 (2017). 
39 Burkart & Lee, supra note 14, 34; Eechambadi, supra note 28, 516. 
40 See text accompanying supra, notes 6 – 7. 
41 Fischel, supra note 7, 147; Burkart & Lee, supra note 14, 34 – 35; and EeChambadi, supra note 28, 517.  
42 Anita Anand, Offloading the Burden of Being Public: An Analysis of Multiple Voting Share Structures, 10 Va. 
L. & Bus. Rev. 395, 401.  
43 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 13, 482. 
44 Wen, supra note 36, 1505. Wen cites as example Facebook’s botched IPO, where underwriters were informed 
just 11 days before the launch of the IPO that Facebook was slashing its revenue estimates. While the news 
reached the banks in time to allow them to either make a profit (by shorting the stock) or avoid substantial 
losses, many retail investors were left out in the cold when the stock price plummeted subsequent to the IPO. 
See also Khadeeja Safdar, Facebook, One Year Later: What Really Happened in the Biggest IPO Flop Ever, 




The theoretical arguments examined in this section suggest that the arguments for and against 
DCS structures are finely balanced. Among the reasons commonly cited to justify the 
structure, the most significant is that it promotes innovation and entrepreneurial risk-taking, 
which is beneficial to both shareholders and the economy as a whole. Conventional 
understanding of market behavior tells us, however, that DCS structures are likely to 
aggravate agency problems by concentrating control in owner-managers whilst further 
disenfranchising outside shareholders. Given these concerns, DCS structures are only  
justified if their positive effects are substantial and exceed the costs thereof. The discussion 
below will briefly consider whether and to what extent empirical evidence gathered from 
jurisdictions that permit DCS structures elucidate that analysis.  
 
B. The Empirical Evidence 
 
Many empirical studies have been undertaken to understand the rationale and effects of DCS 
structures, but the evidence that has emerged is often inconclusive. This is, in part, due to the 
partisan nature of the debate (lobbyists on each side commission and cite studies that 
vindicate their cause45), and, in part, to the analytical difficulties in establishing the impact of 
DCS structures on firm value and profitability.  
 
Because a company’s performance and returns on equity are dynamic and contingent upon a 
wide range of factors, it is often difficult to identify the true drivers that account for 
differences in firm performance: either between different firms at the same time or at 
different times for the same firm.46 One company may perform better than another because of 
its superior product, better leadership, or more efficient operational processes, and hence no 
two companies are so similar or alike as to be truly comparable. To some extent, this 
difficulty may be tempered by looking at large sample sizes but that is often not possible 
given that DCS structures remain a relatively rare phenomenon in most jurisdictions.  
 
 
45 EeChambadi, supra note 28, 526 – 527. 
46 A useful discussion of these difficulties is set out in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s consultation paper on 
dual class shares: see HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEARING LIMITED, CONCEPT PAPER: WEIGHTED VOTING 




Further, some studies—particularly those involving recapitalization—are affected by the 
problem of endogeneity. For example, it is often unclear whether a firm’s (better or worse) 
performance was the reason for recapitalizing as DCS in the first place, or whether that 
performance is a consequence of the new capital structure. The discussion below should, 
therefore, be understood with these difficulties in mind. 
 
For policy makers facing the decision of whether to permit or prohibit DCS structures for 
public companies, the key question is whether such structures destroy firm value. As 
mentioned above, value destruction may come about mainly via the extraction of private 
benefits by minority controllers.  
 
In a thorough review of the relevant empirical research, Adams and Ferreira conclude that the 
empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that controlling shareholders of DCS 
companies are able to extract sizeable private benefits at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders.47 The authors derive this conclusion principally from studies that measure the 
value of control to controlling shareholders. For this purpose, the primary hypothesis is that 
control has value because it allows those in control to extract private benefits from the firm.48 
One method of computing this value is to compare the market prices of different classes of 
shares. The premium at which superior-voting shares trade over inferior-voting shares is 
indicative of the value of control.  
 
Adopting this approach, Nenova established that quite a few countries exhibited high block 
control value, ranging from 48% in South Korea to -2.28% in Hong Kong.49 Importantly, her 
results also demonstrate that legal environments characterized by effective law enforcement, 
good investor protection, and pro-investor takeover rules have the effect of lowering the 
 
47 Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12 Rev. Fin. 51, 79 (2008). 
48 As Zingales explained, “If there were no private benefits, there would be no reasons to hold large blocks of 
share in any one company.”: Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock 
Exchange Experience, 7 Rev. Fin. Stud. 125, 126 (1994). But see Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, 
Recapitalization of One Class of Common Stocks into Dual-class: Growth and Long-run Returns, 12 J. Corp. 
Fin. 243, 344 (2006), who argue that the presence of a voting premium does not always imply that the 
controllers are benefiting at the expense of the holders of inferior vote shares. This is because: 
“[the] shareholders of the inferior voting class would also benefit if the dual-class structure induces the 
controlling managers to take profitable projects that they would otherwise not take. The premium may simply be 
thought of as an optimal compensation mechanism to the controlling managers that is in the best interests of all 
shareholders.”  
49 Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. Fin. 
Econ. 325 (2003). 
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voting control premia. In addition, her analysis suggested that a legal environment 
characterized by strong corporate governance rules is effective in mitigating the risks of 
controller expropriation.  
 
Dyck and Zingales arrived at similar conclusions using a different methodology—by drawing 
inferences from the acquisition prices of controlling blocks in publicly traded companies. 
Their results show that, on average, control value is worth about 14% of the equity value of 
the firm.50 They also found that the control premium is higher in countries where the investor 
is less protected, demonstrating once again that the legal environment has direct impact on 
the extent to which controllers extract private benefits from DCS companies. Thus, these 
studies suggest that DCS structures impose costs on non-controlling shareholders, but such 
costs can be mitigated by appropriate legal rules and effective enforcement. 
 
While the studies on control value provide an indirect means of estimating controllers’ 
private benefits, another group of studies sought to adduce evidence of the direct impact of 
DCS ownership structures on firm performance. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
compared DCS companies with single class share companies and found that a higher 
proportion of insider-voting rights will likely lead to lower firm valuation.51 More 
specifically, Masulis, Wang, and Xie found that increased divergence between insider control 
and cash-flow rights would likely lead to lower shareholder value through greater misuse of 
corporate cash, excessive compensation, value-destroying acquisitions and poor capital 
expenditure.52  
 
In contrast to the above findings, other studies have found that DCS companies  enhance 
shareholder value notwithstanding the risks of expropriation and entrenchment. In a study of 
dual-class IPOs, Böhmer, Sanger, and Vashney found that companies listed with DCS 
structures outperform their single class counterparts in terms of stock returns and operational 
performance, thus suggesting that the benefits of adopting DCS structures outweigh the costs 
for  some firms.53 In another study focused on recapitalizations of single class shares into 
 
50 Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. Fin. 537 
(2004). 
51 Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the 
United States, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1051 (2010).  
52 Ronald Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual Class Companies, 64 J. Fin. 1697 (2009). 
53 Ekkehart Bohmer, Gary C. Sanger & Sanjay B. Varshney, The Effect of Consolidated Control on Firm 
Performance: the Case of Dual-class IPOs” in EMPIRICAL ISSUES IN RAISING EQUITY CAPITAL (Mario Levis, 
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dual class shares, Dimitrov and Jain found that recapitalizations are not undertaken to 
entrench managers but to finance growth without losing control.54 Consequently, they 
observed that such companies experienced higher growth  rates in sales, assets, and operating 
income than their single class competitors, and also enjoy significant long-run abnormal 
returns.  
 
Overall, the empirical evidence is inconclusive as the studies suggest that DCS structures 
could enhance shareholder value in one context but destroy it in another.55 For policy makers, 
this ambiguity leaves room for development in either direction. What is ultimately required is 
a judgment call on the possible impact of greater flexibility in divergence between ownership 
and control. That judgment would relate not only to the effects of such structures on 
shareholders (and other stakeholders) of the firm, but (perhaps more pertinently) on the wider 
economy. In particular, given that robust investor protection is linked to strong financial 
markets (and ultimately, economic growth),56 and that DCS structures may erode investor 
protection by generating private benefits, it would be relevant to ask if the introduction of 
such structures would eventually lead to higher costs of capital that would in turn hamper 
financial development.57 On the other hand, the absolute prohibition of such structures may 
also have cost implications: entrepreneurs may refrain from seeking outside capital or choose 
other forms of control enhancing mechanisms. Balancing such costs is, once again, critical 
but it can only be broadly appraised until more definitive evidence is available.  
 
In the absence of overwhelming evidence that DCS structures are always harmful, it may be 
contended that there is no a priori reason why an absolute prohibition of such structures 
should be maintained. Indeed, if the evidence suggests that DCS structures enhance firm 
value in some contexts, and that the costs of such structures can be mitigated by robust 
investor protection rules, it would be rational to attempt to circumscribe their availability in 
conditions that are likely to optimize share value. This, as we shall see, is largely the 
approach that is adopted in those markets that have accepted DCS structures as a permissible 
form of governance.  
 
ed.), Elsevier, 1996.  
54 See supra note 48, 346 – 347. 
55 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 47, 84. 
56 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (2000). 
57 Adams & Ferreira recognised this possibility but were of the view that the evidence as to effects of DCS 
structures on the financial markets and the wider economy are not as yet clear: see supra note 47, 81. 
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2. A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
 
This section surveys the different approaches that are currently adopted in Canada, the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Hong Kong.  These jurisdictions provide a useful point of 
reference for Singapore as their stock exchanges are among the world’s largest58 and their 




Canada offers an interesting context for study and comparison as its approach to DCS structures 
is largely based on market discipline. Consequently, the regulatory regime is relatively liberal 
with generally no legal prohibitions against DCS structures. Under Canadian corporate law, 
the OSOV principle is the default principle59 but companies are free to provide for multiple 
vote shares in their constitution.60 The listing and public trading of multi-vote shares on 
Canadian stock exchanges is also a common phenomenon.61 The Toronto Stock Exchange 
(“TSX”), for instance, permits the listing of shares with multiple or restricted votes.62 Moreover, 
listed companies may reorganize or reclassify its share capital so as to convert common shares 
into multiple or restricted vote shares provided that such changes are approved by a majority 
of the minority shareholders.63 The TSX does, however, impose certain minimal safeguards 
against risks of abuse and exploitation by the controlling minority. These include the 
requirement for “coat-tail” provisions for all newly listed dual class share issuers64 and various 
disclosure requirements to “alert investors of the fact that there are differences in the voting 
 
58 As of April 2017, the NYSE has the largest market capitalization at US$19.22 trillion, followed by NASDAQ 
at US$6.83 trillion and the LSE Group at US$6.19 trillion.  The Hong Kong Exchanges rank 6th at US$3.33 
trillion while the TMX Group (Canada) ranks 9th at US$1.94 trillion: see The Statistics Portal, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/270126/largest-stock-exchange-operators-by-market-capitalization-of-listed-
companies/. 
59 s 24(3) of the Canadian Business Corporations Act (hereafter “CBCA”). 
60 s 24(4) CBCA.  
61 The proportion of dual class firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange appears to have stabilised between 
20% to 25%: see TARA GRY, DUAL-CLASS STRUCTURES AND BEST PRACTICES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (18 
Aug. 2005), https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0526-e.htm#2end. See also Burkart & Lee, 
supra note 14, 2.  
62 Subject to such conditions as the Exchange may impose as to the total number of votes accorded to the class 
of shares generally or to specific decisions, such as those relating to election and remuneration of directors: see 
TSX VENTURE EXCHANGE, CORPORATE FINANCE MANUAL – POLICY 3.5 RESTRICTED SHARES (June 14, 2010), 
https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/434, at para. 3.5. 
63 Id. at para. 5.2. 
64 Id. at para. 6, the purpose of the coattail is to ensure holders of subordinated shares have an equal opportunity 
to participate in any “control premium” that may be offered in the event of a takeover. 
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powers attached to the different securities of an issuer”.65 
 
Notwithstanding a number of high profile scandals involving DCS firms,66 the consensus in 
Canada appears to be that DCS structure should be permitted as it can be an optimal means of 
financing entrepreneurial activities. Disallowing this form of financing would cause 
entrepreneurs to “shun the stock market, curtail growth of their companies or find sub-optimal 
means of financing” with the result that “[all] would suffer: innovation, investors, economic 
growth and employment.”67 Whilst the risks of exploitation and entrenchment subsist,68 such 
risks appear to be reasonably well contained by adequate minority protection rules (the most 
significant of which is the mandatory coat-tail provision69) fomented, in part, by activist 
institutional investors opposed to DCS structures.70 Consequently, calls for reform in Canada 
appear largely focused on suggestions to improve the governance of DCS structures rather than 
their complete abolition.71 The measures advocated include (inter alia) further tightening of 
the coattail requirement, limiting the voting ratio of different classes of shares or of the total 
number of votes controlled by the insiders or founders, abolishing non-voting shares, and 








65 TSX COMPANY MANUAL, PART VI CHANGES IN CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF LISTED ISSUERS, §624(a),  
http://tmx.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2072&element_id=299. These are aligned with 
the Ontario Securities Commission disclosure rules designed to avoid the use of confusing share terminology 
and on providing clear disclosure of the relative voting power of each class of shares: see SHAREHOLDER 
ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, SECOND CLASS INVESTORS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
SUBORDINATED SHARES IN CANADA (April 2004), 9, http://www.share.ca/files/Second_Class_Investors.pdf.  
66 A particularly notorious incident involved the failed takeover bid for Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. where the 
offerors (together with the minority controllers) had deliberately structured the offer to circumvent the coattail 
provision to deprive holders of common shares of the opportunity to exit at a premium. The bid ultimately failed 
when the Ontario Securities Commission stepped in and declared it to be contrary to public interests: see 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, Dual Class Shares in Canada: An Historical Analysis, 29 Dalhousie L. J. 
117, 151 – 153 (2006).  
67 YVAN ALLAIRE, THE INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, DUAL CLASS 
SHARE STRUCTURES IN CANADA: REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 5 (2006).  
68 See eg. Masulis, Wang & Xie, supra note 52. 
69 According to Allaire, supra note 67, 21 “the coattail provision, along with the tighter governance rules 
implemented over the last ten years and the Canadian legal framework for protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders, have removed most, if not all, of the drivers of price premium and private benefits for Canadian 
dual-class-share structures.” This would, in Allaire’s view, explain why the control premium of Canadian dual 
class shares are among the lowest in the world: id. 11.  
70 Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 66, 154 – 156. 
71 See e.g. Allaire, supra note 67; Daniel Cipollone, Risky Business: A Review of Dual Class Share Structures in 
Canada and a Proposal for Reform, 21 Dalhousie J. Leg. Stud. 62 (2012).  
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B. United States 
 
Compared to Canada, the regulatory regime in the US is more restrictive. The major markets 
(viz., NYSE72 and NASDAQ73) permit the listing of DCS only by way of IPOs but not post-
listing recapitalization. An issuer listed with a single class of shares is not thereby permitted 
to convert existing shares into multiple-vote shares or issue new classes of shares with 
different voting rights. That said, the US regime is also liberal in that it imposes few bespoke 
rules to safeguard minority interests in DCS companies. One exception is the specific 
prescription that non-voting shares must be accorded substantially similar rights (except for 
voting) to those of common shares.74 Beyond that, minority shareholders of DCS companies 
can only look to standard safeguards such as prohibitions against conflicts of interests and 
misappropriation of corporate opportunities for protection against expropriation.75 Curiously, 
NYSE listing rules also exempt “controlled companies” (companies with block-holders 
controlling 50% or more of voting rights) from the requirements of majority board 
independence.76 This has, unsurprisingly, been accused of engendering “a rubberstamp board 
that is beholden to the chief executive”.77  
 
DCS structures have long been a divisive topic in the US. In particular, the use of such 
structures has been criticized by institutional investors and their representatives, who argue 
that such structures effectively create “the equivalent of a corporate safe room by making it 
nearly impossible for shareholders to replace directors, challenge management, or force 
change in control transactions.”78 Thus, the Council of Institutional Investors has urged both 
the NYSE and NASDAQ to ban DCS structures, citing empirical studies that establish that 
dual class companies underperform those with single-class share structures, and have more 
weaknesses in internal controls and related party transactions.79 Likewise, CalPERS, the 
 
72 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §313(A) (2013). 
73 NASDAQ, NASDAQ Stock Market Rule §5640 (2009).   
74 NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §313(B) (2013). 
75 Id. §303A.10 (2013). See also the discussion in Roger Barker & Iris H-Y Chiu, Protecting Minority 
Shareholders in Block-controlled Companies: Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in Comparison 
with Investor Protection Regimes in New York and Hong Kong, 10 Cap. Mkt. L. J. 98, 120 (2015). 
76 NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §303A.00 (2013). See also NASDAQ Stock Market Rules §5615(c)(2) 
(2009). 
77 EeChambadi, supra note 28, 518.  
78 Glover & Thamodaran, supra note 33, 10. 
79 Council of Institutional Investors, Letter to the New York Stock Exchange, Oct. 2, 2012, 
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/10_2_12_cii_letter_to_nyse_dual_class_sto




largest public pension fund in the US, has indicated that it would boycott companies with 
DCS structures80 and has instituted legal actions to stop companies from issuing more 
weighted vote shares to further entrench the controllers.81 Such persistent opposition of 
institutional investors has yielded palpable results. A striking example is the S&P 500’s 
recent decision (following an uproar over Snap Inc.’s controversial issue of non-voting 
shares) to exclude companies with multiple voting share structures.82 MSCI, another major 
index provider, had temporarily blocked new companies with unequal voting structures from 
two of its indexes pending a consultation on the merits of a permanent exclusion. 
  
Strong criticisms notwithstanding, DCS structures will likely continue to feature in US 
markets.83 Its popularity amongst exceptionally successful technology companies, the 
perception that existing legal infrastructure adequately constrains abuses, faith in visionary 
founders, as well as intense regulatory competition both at home and abroad—all coalesce 
into the belief that such unique governance structures are not only defensible but necessary. 
 
C. United Kingdom 
 
Listing on the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) is organized under the Premium/Standard 
listing regime. The main difference between the two categories is that Standard Listing only 
requires compliance with minimum governance standards stipulated by the European Union, 
whilst the Premium Listing requires compliance with enhanced listing requirements laid 
down by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).84 DCS structures are permitted under 
Standard but not Premium listing.85 Hence, DCS structures are not absolutely prohibited in 
the UK. Nevertheless, the general observation is that it is rare for public companies to list 
with dual or multiple vote structures.86 Commentators attribute this relative low occurrence to 
 
80 Shanny Basar, Calpers Sets Sights on Dual-Class Stock Structures, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 2012, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443855804577601271252759472. 
81 CalPERS News, CalPERS Sues to Stop IAC/InterActiveCorp from Diluting Shareowners' Voting Power, Dec. 
12, 2016, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2016/interactivecorp-diluting-shareowners-
voting-power. 
82 Trevor Hunnicutt, S&P 500 to Exclude Snap after Voting Rights Debate, Reuters, Aug. 1, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-s-p/sp-500-to-exclude-snap-after-voting-rights-debate-
idUSKBN1AH2RV. Existing components of the S&P index with dual or multiple vote share classes (e.g. 
Alphabet Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) will be “grandfathered”.  
83 EeChambadi, supra note 28, 529. 
84 See London Stock Exchange, Listing Regime < http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/main-market/companies/primary-and-secondary-listing/listing-categories.htm>.  
85 See supra, note 4.  
86 In a study conducted by Shearman and Sterling LLP in 2007, it was found that only 5% of the UK companies 
analyzed had multiple voting structures: see SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, PROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN 
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the strong presence of activist institutional shareholders in the UK.87 Institutional investors 
who believe DCS structures to be harmful by reason of their disenfranchising effects on 
outside shareholders routinely opposed such structures.88 Over time, this sustained opposition 
has influenced policy makers such that the UK government is said to have “systematically 
discouraged” the IPO of new companies with DCS structures.89 Indeed, the FCA’s steadfast 
adherence to the default OSOV rule is evidenced by both its rejection of Manchester United’s 
bid to list on the LSE with a DCS structure90 and its very public support of Hong Kong’s 
refusal to accede to Alibaba’s proposed dual class listing.91  
 
A further development that may be seen as signalling the FCA’s resolve to strengthen 
minority shareholder rights—and thereby distance itself from unequal voting structures—is 
the introduction of an enhanced listing regime for block-controlled premium-listed 
companies.92  The enhancements seek, firstly, to limit the influence of the controlling 
shareholder by requiring it to enter into a mandatory agreement undertaking to transact with 
the company at arm’s length and not to take any action to impede or circumvent proper 
compliance with the listing rules;93 and secondly, to give more control to minority 
shareholders by subjecting the election of independent directors94 and delisting of the 
 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN EU LISTED COMPANIES: COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY (2007) at 12. 
http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/study_report_en.pdf. In total, 40 UK listed companies were analyzed in 
this study, comprising a mix of top 20 market-capital companies and small and recently listed companies. 
87 See Amy Chen, Spending Less Time with the Family: Are Dual-Class Shares A Necessary Evil?, 7 Queen 
Mary L. J. 72, 87 (2016); Wolf-Georg Ringe, Deviations from Ownership-Control Proportionality – Economic 
Protectionism Revisited in COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTION, 228 (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe 
eds., 2010).  
88 Flora Huang, Dual Class Shares around the Top Global Financial Centres, J. Bus. L. 137, 145 – 146 (2017). 
Huang further argued that a further reason for DCS’s lack of popularity is the break through rule that is present 
in the Article 11 of the UK Takeover Bids Directive. Essentially, this rule allows a shareholder who owns 75% 
of total equity to break through the company’s voting structure and exercise control according to the one share 
one-vote principle. Further, the investor will have complete control of the firm and can appoint/remove board 
members. Thus, should an outside investor succeed in acquiring 75% of the ordinary shares, it will essentially 
be able to break the control of the founders despite them holding shares with more voting rights.  
89 Chen, supra note 87, 88. 
90 Id. 87. 
91 Commenting on the Hong Kong regulator’s decision, Martin Wheatley (then chief executive of the FCA) said 
that “no matter how difficult it would be to lose a very high-profile company to list, it is important to keep the 
principle to protect shareholders' interests”: see Enoch Yiu, British Regulator Backs Hong Kong Stance on 
Alibaba IPO, South China Morning Post, Mar. 20, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/business/money/markets-
investing/article/1452681/british-regulator-backs-hong-kong-stance-alibaba.  
92 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, RESPONSE TO CP13/15—ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LISTING 
REGIME (May. 2014), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps14-8-response-cp13-
15-%E2%80%93-enhancing-effectiveness-listing-regime. The new rules took effect from May 16, 2014. For a 
thorough critique of this reform, see Barker & Chiu, supra note 75. 
93 FCA Handbook, L.R. 6.5.4 and L.R. 9.2.2AD. 
94 Id. LR 9.2.2E and L.R. 9.2.2F. 
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company to independent shareholder approval.95 Underpinned, as it were, by the 
“fundamental concept” that shareholders are entitled to participate directly in the governance 
of the companies they own,96 these changes suggest that the UK regulators are likely to 
continue to view with disfavor disproportional voting structures that effectively 
disenfranchise minority shareholders. That said, one cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that the UK regulators may review and soften their stance on this issue as 
competitive pressures mount against the backdrop of Brexit and growing acceptance of DCS 
structures elsewhere (such as Hong Kong and Singapore).97  
 
D. Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong does not currently countenance the public listing of companies with DCS 
structures,98 but this state of affairs will soon be consigned to history as the Hong Kong 
Exchange (“HKEx”) has—in a move to defend Hong Kong’s pre-eminence as the leading 
global IPO destination—announced its decision to push ahead with DCS listings. This 
outcome was not, of course, achieved without a protracted and stormy campaign sparked by 
the painful loss of Alibaba’s potential listing on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
(“SEHK”) in 2014. The heated debate that ensued prompted the HKEx (parent company of 
SEHK) to embark on an extensive review of DCS structures and sought market feedback 
through the issue of a Concept Paper.99 But while there was sufficient support to proceed to a 
second stage of consultation,100 this first attempt at reform came to an abrupt halt when the 
Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) publicly rejected the HKEX’s proposals.101 At 
 
95 Id. LR 5.2.5(2). 
96 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FEEDBACK ON CP12/25—ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LISTING 
REGIME (Nov. 2013) at para. 1.2, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp13-15.pdf. 
97 Indeed, the FCA noted the value of DCS structures as a means of providing growth capital to early-stage 
science and technology companies in a recent review: see FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, DISCUSSION 
PAPER: REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIMARY MARKETS: THE UK PRIMARY MARKETS LANDSCAPE (Feb. 
2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp17-02.pdf 
98 See HKEx Main Board Listing Rule 8.11; Growth Enterprise Market Listing Rule 11.25. Although the HKEx 
is empowered “in exceptional circumstances” to approve listings of DCS companies on a case-by-case basis, no 
DCS company has to date been admitted by the HKEx under this exception: HKEx Concept Paper, supra note 
46. 
99 HKEx Concept Paper, supra note 46. 
100 HKEX, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS TO CONCEPT PAPER ON WEIGHTED VOTING RIGHTS (2015), 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Market-Consultations/2011-to-2015/August-2014-
Weighted-Voting-Rights/Conclusions/cp2014082cc.pdf. 
101 SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, SFC STATEMENT ON THE SEHK’S DRAFT PROPOSAL ON WEIGHTED 
VOTING RIGHTS (25 June 2015), http://edistributionweb.sfc.hk/t/ViewEmail/j/C5CD004D12EE9F25/. 
F672ACDCDBF32846942A2DF08F503B7C.  This dramatic turn of events spawned, in a short time, a 
proliferation of academic commentary. On the one hand, there are those who argue that some relaxation of the 
current strict policy is defensible since it is beneficial to have greater flexibility in ownership structures and that 
the drawbacks of such structures can (mostly) be managed by prescribing appropriate legal rules: see eg, 
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that time, the SFC was concerned, inter alia, that the eligibility criteria identified by the 
proposals were inherently uncertain, and that the suggested safeguards would not be 
sufficient to protect minority shareholders against the risk of abuse by controlling 
shareholders.  
 
For a while, the SFC’s objections forged an uneasy truce. However, the pressure for Hong 
Kong to keep pace with the more liberal regimes of other leading financial markets mounted 
as Chinese information technology firms increasingly prefer to list in the US with weighted-
voting structures.102 In the face of such aggressive and relentless competition, the Hong Kong 
regulators had to respond with concrete measures to protect the market. In June 2017, the 
HKEx issued another Concept Paper to seek public feedback on a proposed third board to 
facilitate fund-raising by mega-technology firms with DCS structures and smaller start-
ups.103 However, this proposal was soon aborted.104 In place of a third board, the HKEx 
concluded that the better way forward was to amend the listing rules to accommodate the 
listing of “New Economy” companies with weighted voting rights (“WVR”) structures as 
well as pre-revenue Biotech companies.105 By this time, the SFC was supportive of the move. 
This volte-face is no doubt a pragmatic concession in view of the competitive landscape.106 
 
 
Junzheng Shen, The Anatomy of Dual Class Shares: A Comparative Perspective, 46 H.K.L.J. 477 (2016). 
Opponents, on the other hand, have argued that Hong Kong’s market structure, which is dominated by 
concentrated ownership, has (rightly) caused regulators to favor the extant approach that emphasizes ex ante 
prevention of abuses over ex post enforcement: Raymond Chan & John Ho, Should Listed Companies be 
Allowed to Adopt Dual-Class Share Structure in Hong Kong? 43 Common L. World Rev. 155, 175 (2014). Yet 
another view is that the unique social and political context of Hong Kong renders perceptions of fairness and 
equity particularly critical in its formulation of economic policies, and it is in maintaining a high quality legal 
infrastructure (more so than the acceptance of DCS structures) that would help Hong Kong to preserve its 
competitive edge in attracting foreign as well as Chinese listing applications: see Shen and Young, Dual Share 
Plan in Context: Making Sense of Hong Kong’s Decision Not to Embrace Alibaba’s Listing, 26 Int’l Co. Com. 
L. Rev. 4 (2015). 
102 As of 13 June 2017, “33 out of 116 (28%) Mainland companies with primary listings in the US have  
[weighted voting rights] structures 25, their combined market capitalisation of US$561 billion represents 84% 
of the market value of all US-listed Mainland companies. Their market capitalisation is equivalent to 15% of the 
entire market capitalisation of the Hong Kong market”: see HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEARING LIMITED, 
CONCEPT PAPER: NEW BOARD at para. 40 (June 2017), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-
Market/News/Market-Consultations/Concept-Paper-on-New-Board/cp2017061.pdf.  
103 Id. See also Enoch Yiu, Hong Kong Moves Closer to Dual-share Listings as SFC Backs Consultation on 
Third Board, South China Morning Post (Apr. 28, 2017). 
104 Laura He & Enoch Yiu, Hong Kong Stock Exchange Backs Down on Demand for Third Board to Let Start-
ups Raise Funds, South China Morning Post (Oct. 23, 2017).  
105 HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEARING LIMITED, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS: NEW BOARD CONCEPT 
PAPER at para 31 (Dec. 2017), http://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Market-
Consultations/2016-Present/June-2017-Concept-Paper-on-New-Board/Conclusions-(December-
2017)/cp2017061cc.pdf (hereafter “Consultation Conclusions”). 
106 Enoch Yiu, Securities Commission Backs Introduction of Dual Class Shares on Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
South China Morning Post (Dec. 20, 2017). 
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As it stands, the WVR framework outlined by the HKEx is tightly circumscribed (at least 
initially) to admit only companies with demonstrated potential for extraordinarily high 
growth. Hence, a WVR structure would ordinarily only qualify for listing if it were an 
“innovative company” 107 with a track record of and potential for high business growth;108 has 
received meaningful funding from sophisticated investors109 and an expected market 
capitalization of at least HK$10 billion and total revenue of at least HK$1 billion in the last 
financial year.110 In addition, WVR holders must be persons who have materially contributed 
to the company’s growth and who are or will be directors of the company with executive 
functions post-IPO.111 To attenuate the heightened risks posed by WVR structures, the HKEx 
also included in its proposal a slew of investor-protection measures, of which the more salient 
ones are: 
 
(a) The use of WVR structures will be restricted to new listing applicants and the 
proportion of WVR may not be increased post-IPO except in very limited 
circumstances.112 
(b) Only directors of the company are eligible to hold shares with WVR. The WVR will 
lapse upon the director’s death, cessation as director, or transfer to a non-director. 
Such directors will also be required to meet minimum equity threshold at the time of 
IPO.113 
(c) Voting differential between the superior and ordinary shares are capped at the ratio of 
10:1. Other than voting rights, the rights attached to both classes of shares must be 
equal in all aspects. Selected key decisions such as material changes to constitutional 
documents, variation of class rights, appointment and removal of independent 
directors and winding up of the company will be voted on an OSOV basis.114 
 
107 These are technology and other innovative companies whose assets comprise largely intellectual property 
and other intangible assets: see Consultation Conclusions, supra note 105, at paras. 249 and 259(a).  
108 Id. at para. 259(b). 
109 Id. at para. 259(e). 
110 The revenue requirement is dispensed with if the WVR structure has an expected market capitalization of at 
least HK$40 billion: id. at para. 262.  
111 Id. at paras. 259(c) and (d). 
112 Id. at para. 264. 
113 Id. at supra n 105, para 265. Other than the cessation of the WVR in these circumstances, the HKEx did not 
think it necessary to impose time-defined sunset clauses. In its view, such a requirement would “likely make 
Hong Kong very uncompetitive versus overseas markets where no requirement for a sunset clause exists 
(particularly the US)”: see id. at para. 270.   
114 Id. at para. 266. 
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(d) Companies listed with WVR structures will be required to constitute a corporate 
governance committee comprised of independent non-executive directors to ensure 
compliance with governance rules.115 
(e) Companies with WVR structures must further enshrine the prescribed safeguards in 
their constitutions so as to afford shareholders private redress in the event of 
breach.116 
 
The intention of this proposed framework is unambiguous: it is to single out the “truly big 
boys” that have the (actual and potential) scale of success that justifies limited incursion in 
investor protection. The proposal is also innovative and coherent as it seeks to adhere closely 
to the visionary-founder rationale by restricting WVR to founder-directors (and by this means 
ensure that the controlling minority is constrained by the fiduciary obligations that they owe 
as directors to the company). Further, the exceptionally broad range of suggested safeguards 
evidence an earnest attempt at seeking optimal ways to preserve investor rights. In practice, 
however, their efficacy may still be limited by an enforcement regime that is characterised by 
relatively restrictive access to minority actions and general shareholder inertia (due, perhaps, 
to the absence of a litigious culture fuelled by contingency fee-based class actions), with the 
result that the extraction of private benefits by controlling shareholders will continue to be 
difficult to detect and remedy.117 This, as we shall see, is also a regulatory constraint that 
Singapore has to contend with. 
    
3. EVOLUTION OF DCS IN SINGAPORE 
 
Historically, the principle of OSOV was firmly entrenched in Singapore. Section 64 of the 
Companies Act118 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” or “CA”) made clear that a public 
company and its subsidiaries (other than a newspaper company119) may only issue equity 
shares that confer upon its holder one vote per share.120 In 2003, this rule was relaxed to 
 
115 Id. at para. 268. 
116 Id. at para. 269. 
117 See Chan & Ho, supra note 101, 175 – 179.  
118 Cap. 50, 2006 Rev. Ed., §64(1) read with §64(5).  
119 Newspaper companies are expressly permitted to issue management shares that carry more votes than 
ordinary shares. For example, Singapore Press Holdings Limited has both ordinary and management shares 
which carry respective 1 and 200 votes per share: see SINGAPORE PRESS HOLDINGS ANNUAL REPORT 2017 at 
127, http://sph.listedcompany.com/misc/annualreport/2017/SPH%20AR2017.pdf. 
120 Although this did not prohibit public companies from issuing preference shares with different voting rights 
(see CA § 75). Preference shares are a separate class of shares with distinct economic risks and benefits from 
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allow private companies that are subsidiaries of public companies to issue shares with 
multiple, limited, or no voting rights.121 This was thought to be desirable as it would afford 
such companies greater flexibility in structuring joint ventures and strategic alliances.122 
However, the same extension was deemed inappropriate for public companies. Allowing a 
public company to issue shares with multiple or no voting rights would result in the 
concentration of control in the hands of a few without commensurate economic investments. 
Such an outcome would run counter to the fundamental precept of shareholder democracy, 
the cornerstone of good governance.123 
 
By 2011, however, regulatory attitude had shifted owing to concerns that insistence on the 
one share per vote principle might render Singapore uncompetitive as a destination for IPOs. 
The trigger for this turnaround is often traced to Manchester United’s aborted plans to list on 
the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”) on account of the latter’s ban of dual class share 
structures.124 In a report issued by the Steering Committee for the Review of the Companies 
Act, the committee recommended abolishing the one-share-one-vote structure to allow public 
companies greater flexibility in capital management.125 Acting on this recommendation, the 
Singapore Parliament amended §64 of the Act in 2014 to clarify that the one-share-one-vote 
principle is only a default rule which may be displaced by contrary provisions in the 
company’s constitution.126 Following this amendment, public companies became free to 
adopt dual class share structures.  
 
 
those of ordinary shares. In contrast, dual class shares typically comprise classes of shares with similar 
economic benefits and risks but different voting rights.  
121 Companies (Amendment) Act 2003 § 5. The amendment came into effect on 15 May 2003.  
122 REPORT OF THE COMPANY LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK COMMITTEE, at para. 3.6.4, 2002   
(hereinafter referred to as the “CLRFC Report”). 
123 CLRFC Report, at paras. 3.6.2 – 3.6.3. 
124 See Singapore to Allow Dual-class Shares to Attract Listings, Reuters (Oct. 3, 2012); and Lance Lim, Recent 
Amendments to the Companies Act: Rethinking Dual-class Shares in Singapore – Caveat Emptor?, Sing. Law. 
Gaz., 30 (Jan. 2015).  
125 MINISTRY OF FINANCE, REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW OF COMPANIES ACT, at 3-14 
(June 2011). 
126 See Companies (Amendment) Act 2014 §33, which took effect on Jan. 3, 2016. 
Under the amended rules, the issue of shares with no or different voting rights is subject to the following 
safeguards: 
(1) A public company may only issue different classes of shares if (a) its constitution provides for the issue of 
different classes of shares, (b) the rights attached to each class of shares are set out therein, and (c) the issue is 
approved by special resolution: see CA §64A(1) & (3); and 
(2) The holder of a non-voting share will still have one vote in a general meeting to vote on any resolution that 
seeks to wind up the company voluntarily or vary the rights attached to that share: see CA §64(4). 
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Although the change in general corporate law did not apply to listed companies,127 it was 
widely seen to herald a similar development in securities regulation. In early 2017, the 
Listings Advisory Committee (“LAC”), a committee comprising independent and 
experienced market professionals set up to advise the SGX on listing policies, endorsed the 
listing of DCS structures in the belief that it could help “Singapore’s capital market … 
become more attractive for businesses run by entrepreneurs to list, thereby providing 
investors access to a wider range of companies and sectors.”128 However, LAC’s support was 
predicated upon the institution of various safeguards against risks to investors.  
 
Since then, the SGX has publicly consulted129 on the LAC’s recommendations and confirmed 
its decision to allow dual class share structures.130 More recently, it has issued a further 
consultation paper131 (“SGX Consultation Paper II”) to solicit public feedback on a proposed 
listing framework for DCS structures. This proposal restricts DCS to new listings132 and to 
occasions where an issuer demonstrates it is “suitable” for adopting such a structure.133 The 
factors relevant for determining an issuer’s suitability for listing with a DCS structure include 
the company’s business model, its operating track record, the role and contribution of the 
holders of multiple-vote shares, and participation by sophisticated investors.134   
 
Similar to the framework proposed for Hong Kong,  the SGX proposal comprises substantial 
safeguards against the risks of entrenchment and expropriation.  These measures include: 
 
127 SINGAPORE EXCHANGE, THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE (Sep. 20, 2011). 
128 LISTINGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE: FY 2016 ANNUAL REPORt at 13. 
129 SGX CONSULTATION PAPER, POSSIBLE LISTING FRAMEWORK FOR DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES (Feb. 16, 
2017), http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/71f41364-8584-4da0-b8a5-
7891dd16e52e/DCS+Consultation+Paper+%28SGX+20170216%29%28Final%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
(hereafter referred to as “SGX Consultation Paper I”). 
130 Cai Hongxiang & Angela Tan, SGX Introduces Dual-Class Shares and Unveils Debt Issue Plans, Business 
Times, Jan. 20, 2018. 
131 SGX CONSULTATION PAPER, PROPOSED LISTING FRAMEWORK FOR DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES (Mar. 
28, 2018), http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/bc5e0f06-26d4-4564-9445-
e14d79529846/Consultation+Paper+on+Proposed+Listing+Framework+for+Dual+Class+Share+Structures.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES ((hereafter referred to as “SGX Consultation Paper II”).  
132 Id. at Part II, para. 2.1. Existing companies with a OSOV structure would not be permitted to convert to a 
DCS structure post-listing. 
133 Id. at Part II, para. 2.2. 
134 Id. Such applications would also be referred to the LAC for review and advice, at least during the initial 
phase of the implementation of the new regime (see Id. at Part II, para. 2.3). Previously, the SGX had 
contemplated imposing two additional listing criteria: (1) a minimum market capitalization of S$500 million 
and (2) sophisticated investors must have subscribed for at least 90% or the public float (see SGX Consultation 
Paper I, supra note 129, at Part II, paras 4.7 and 4.9) but this suggestion has been abandoned as it did not have 
the support of consultees. 
 24 
imposing a maximum voting differential (between multiple and one-vote shares) of 10:1;135 
enhancing the rights of one-vote shareholders to convene general meetings;136  prohibiting 
post-IPO issue of multiple-vote shares;137 restricting the issue of multiple-vote shares to 
directors;138  requiring the automatic conversion of multiple-vote shares to single-vote shares 
once the director disposes of his shares or when he ceases to hold executive office in the 
company;139 requiring enhanced independent elements on board committees;140 and 
mandating an enhanced voting process (which accords only one vote to each multiple-vote 
share) to certain reserved matters including changes to the issuer’s constitution, variation of 
share rights and the appointment and removal of independent directors.141 
 
Singapore’s proposal to introduce DCS has stirred both excitement and controversy. 
Supporters see this potential development as “a progressive step forward to keep pace with 
global markets”142 and as a move that could help to establish Singapore as a “leading 
technology listing market” that attracts high profile IPOs.143 Supporters also argue that if 
Singapore does not woo start-ups by accepting DCS, it may “be squeezing out huge chunks 
of growth”.144 On the other hand, detractors, are pessimistic about the consequences of 
allowing DCS. Mak Yuen Teen, a vocal critic, castigates the introduction of DCS as a 
retrograde step—its effect is to “[export] the monitoring function to third parties[—]to the 
government, the courts, the regulators … because dual class shares will severely inhibit the 
role of directors, shareholders and markets in corporate governance.”145 Mak further points 
out that Singapore lacks the legal infrastructure needed to protect investors against the 
heightened risks of abuses inherent in unequal voting structures. In the US, where a 
disclosure-based caveat emptor approach predominates, shareholder rights are “backed by 
strong regulatory enforcement, a very developed commercial court system and the 
 
135 SGX Consultation Paper II, supra note 131, at Part III, para. 1.1. 
136 Id. at Part III, para. 2.1. 
137 Id. at Part III, para. 3.1, except in the event of rights issues. 
138 Id. at Part III, para. 4.1. 
139 Id. at Part III, para. 4.3, although shareholders may approve of any deviation from this requirement through 
an enhanced voting process.  
140 Id. at Part IV, para 1.1. This means that the majority of the Nominating Committee, Remuneration 
Committee and Audit Committee, including the Chairman, must be independent. 
141 Id. at Part IV, para. 2.2. 
142 Lim, supra note 3.  
143 Oliver Ward, The SGX Grows Stronger from its Challenges and is on the Cusp of a Turnaround, ASEAN 
TODAY, Sep. 29, 2017. 
144 MICHELLE DY, THE FUTURE OF A DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURE IN SINGAPORE: ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 
REPORT,  Dec. 6, 2016, https://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/pdfs/reports/CBFL-Rep-MD2.pdf.  
145 Mak Yuen Teen, Say No to Dual Class Shares, Business Times, Nov. 27, 2015. 
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availability of contingency-fee class actions.”146 In contrast, there is a general lack of 
shareholder activism in Singapore,147 as investors rely primarily on public enforcement to 
guard against the excessive exploits of controllers.148  
 
4. CHARTING THE MIDDLE PATH 
 
In deciding whether to lift the ban on DCS in Singapore, the SGX has had to squarely 
confront the conflict between its rational pursuit of profits as a for-profit demutualized 
exchange, and its regulatory function in ensuring high standards of investor protection. A 
vigorous investor protection regime is crucial for maintaining a strong and vibrant securities 
market,149 but DCS structures threaten to undermine that by subverting outsider monitoring 
and augmenting the risks of private benefit extraction. At the same time, however, the 
uptrend in DCS listings among technology companies is a reality that cannot be ignored. 
Attracting high-growth companies to Singapore is important for optimizing SGX’s revenue 
and market capitalization, defending the country’s position as a leading financial market in 
the region, and generating “positive externalities”150 of growth and employment in the wider 
economy.151 Seen in that light, the decision over DCS listings primarily requires a balancing 
of divergent public (viz, investor protection and wider economic) interests.  
 
The safeguards outlined in the SGX Consultation Paper II suggest that Singapore, like Hong 
Kong, is charting a pragmatic yet cautious path forward. DCS structures will be permitted but 
only on an exceptional basis on proof of “suitability”. Investor protection will still be 
paramount, but such protection will reside in a series of safeguards rather than in rigid 
adherence to the OSOV principle. The result is a unique regime that has more safeguards, and 
is therefore stricter, than those found in other jurisdictions.152 As a matter of theory and 
evidence, this balance between minority protection and promoting entrepreneurial financing 
 
146 Mak Yuen Teen, The Risks of Having Minority Controlling Shareholders in Firms, Business Times, Dec. 28, 
2017. 
147 Although there are signs that shareholder activism is increasing: see infra note 166168. 
148 See Luh Luh Lan & Umakanth Varottil, Shareholder Empowerment in Controlled Companies: The Case in 
Singapore, 583 – 585 in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (Randall Thomas & Jennifer Hill 
eds. 2015).  
149 Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets,  55 Bus. Law. 1565 (2000). 
150 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, OFFICIAL REPORT, vol. 92 (Oct. 8, 2014).  
151 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE ECONOMY: PIONEERS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION, 
Recommendation SC3.9 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.gov.sg/~/media/cfe/downloads/cfe%20report.pdf?la=en. 
152 Dy, supra note 144, 7. 
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is defensible since there is some consensus that DCS issued with adequate investor protection 
enhances share value.153  
 
Although it is not possible at this early stage of its development, to comment on the efficacy 
of the proposed new regime,, several observations may nevertheless be made of its 
implications. 
 
First, the developments in Singapore and Hong Kong are significant because they entail 
regulatory innovation. In both jurisdictions, an optimal compromise is thought to be found in 
combining weighted voting arrangements with stringent listing criteria and extensive 
safeguards. This combination deviates from the market-based approach in the US and 
Canada, where DCS structures are only lightly-regulated so that market discipline remains a 
significant restraint of abuse. This deviation reflects the appreciation that a light-touch 
approach works only in contexts where the corporate governance system is not founded on 
only formal rules but also “a wide array of complementary institutions, constraints, and 
practices that work together to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.”154 
These would include factors such as diffused share ownership, an active market for control, 
an experienced and sophisticated judiciary that regularly articulates standards of best 
practices (e.g., Delaware’s Court of Chancery), and other “second-order” institutions (such as 
investment bankers, securities analysts, accounting firms, lawyers, rating agencies and the 
financial media) that help to monitor compliance with corporate governance rules.155 In 
contrast, the market in Singapore is largely characterised by concentrated ownership held by 
the State:156 the market for control is practically non-existent and shareholder activism as 
well as enforcement are relatively subdued. This divergence in the overall “institutional 
mix”157 of different jurisdictions thus renders the wholesale importation of the US regime 
inappropriate. Instead, a modified scheme with extensive safeguards is necessary to make up 
for the lack of complementary institutions in Singapore. 
 
 
153 As discussed in supra Section 1.  
154 Troy Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing US Corporate Law 
Isn’t the Answer, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055, 1075 – 1076 (2004). 
155 Id. 1094 – 1095. 
156 Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 
J. Fin. 471 (1999).  
157 Paredes, supra note 154, 1060. 
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One may, of course, doubt the efficacy of this proposal: to the extent that the safeguards 
prescribed by Singapore or Hong Kong are more restrictive than those found in other 
jurisdictions, why would issuers choose to list there?158 There is force in such scepticism. To 
the extent that DCS structures are desired for their ability to enlarge and entrench board 
control, their appeal would likely diminish as the austerity of safeguards increases. That said, 
there is no reason to assume that issuers are always motivated by the desire to exploit.159 A 
rational issuer generally seeks to list on an exchange with a strong investor protection regime 
in order to minimise its cost of capital. In the context of DCS listings, an issuer who is 
willing to subscribe to the additional prescribed safeguards would be perceived as 
authenticating its commitment to high standards of corporate governance. When that occurs, 
the safeguards would serve as a badge of quality rather than as a form of deterrence. It 
remains to be seen whether such an approach would succeed in identifying the true winners 
that preserve founder autonomy without eroding responsible governance. But to the extent 
that it is successful, this novel approach would serve as a striking example of how regulatory 
competition could excite a race to the top rather than the bottom. 
  
A second observation concerns the regulatory philosophy underlying the proposed listing 
framework. Under the proposed regime, SGX is ultimately responsible for deciding whether 
a company is “suitable” for adopting DCS structures. To the extent that this involves an 
assessment of the merits of a listing application, it seems redolent of the outmoded merit-
based approach160 and hence a departure from the market-driven, disclosure-based approach 
that has shaped securities regulation in Singapore over the last two decades.161  Although 
such deviation may be seen as an isolated measure to mitigate the heightened risks of DCS 
structures, it is also illustrative of the adaptations that are necessary when applying the 
market-based model of corporate governance to less sophisticated and developed markets. In 
such markets, a measure of paternalism remains important to make up for inadequate market 
 
158 ACGA Submission on SGX Consultation: Possible Listing Framework for Dual-Class Share Structures, Apr. 
11, 2017, https://www.acga-
asia.org/upload/files/20170411_ACGA_Submission_SGX_DCS_Consultation_Final.pdf. See also Goh Eng 
Yeow, Protecting Investors in Dual-class Listings, Business Times, Dec. 5, 2016 (arguing that DCS should be 
disciplined by market forces as “the best safeguard is to have no safeguard.”)  
159 Fischel, supra note 7, 128 – 129. 
160 Where the regulator, rather than the market, judges the suitability of securities being offered to the public 
company. 
161 A disclosure-based regime is a key tenet of financial regulation in Singapore: see MONETARY AUTHORITY OF 
SINGAPORE, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN SINGAPORE, April 2004 (Sep. 2015) at 
para. 15. 
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mechanisms.162 However, the obvious drawback of a more regulated regime is the risk of 
moral hazard—investors may discount the risks of acquiring inferior-voting shares if they 
perceive SGX’s approval of a particular DCS listing as an assurance against the downside 
risks of their investment. The result is that, rather than sensitizing investors to the higher risks 
of DCS structures, the “suitability” criterion may have the opposite effect of inducing 
complacency. Given this concern, it may be that such a discretionary criterion is only 
appropriate at the germinal stage of the new framework and ought eventually be replaced by 
a more objective measure of eligibility. 
 
Finally, there may be merits in the criticism that the proposed framework does not 
sufficiently address the risks of ineffective enforcement. In the first round of consultation, 
SGX acknowledged the importance of enforcement as a means of controlling managerial 
opportunism but took the view that the existing enforcement regime is sufficiently robust 
since both private and public enforcement options have increased in recent years.163 It cites, 
as examples, the extension of statutory derivative actions to listed companies164—and 
institutional investors can fund such actions—and the set-up of an independent Listings 
Disciplinary Committee.165 However, while there are signs of increased activism,166 
institutional investors in Singapore have traditionally preferred to influence management 
decisions through media campaigns rather than seek recompense through enforcement of 
legal rights.167 In the near to medium term, therefore, some measure of enforcement deficit is 
likely to persist.168 So even if the holders of multiple-vote shares, being directors, are obliged 
to act in the company’s interests, the enforcement of such duty would still be weak given the 
 
162 Hans Tjio, Enforcing Corporate Disclosure, Sing. J. Legal Stud. 332, 334 [2009]. 
163 SGX CONSULTATION PAPER I, supra note 129 at Part III, para. 2.5. 
164 CA § 216A, as amended by Companies (Amendment) Act 2014, § 146. 
165 SGX Regulatory Announcement, Gautam Banerjee to Chair SGX Listings Advisory Committee, Eric Ang to 




166 There is, for example, increased activist-investor interests in Singapore stocks: see Klaus Wille & Jonathan 
Burgos, Activist Investors Take Aim at Singapore’s ‘Buy, Pray and Hope’ Model, Bloomberg, Nov 4, 2016. A 
recent study also suggests that there is a clear trend of increase in shareholder-initiated general meetings: see 
MAK YUEN TEEN & CHEW YI HONG, THE SINGAPORE REPORT ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: THE DAWN OF 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM at 24 (Mar. 2017), http://governanceforstakeholders.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Shareholder-Meetings-Volume-3-.pdf. 
167 Lee Suet Fern & Elizabeth Kong Sau-Wai, Singapore, in FRANCIS J AQUILA, THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
AND ACTIVISM REVIEW (2nd ed, Sep. 2017), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-shareholder-rights-and-
activism-review-edition-2/1147520/singapore. 
168 In the context of disclosure obligations, such  deficit is said to reflect the legislative emphasis on corporate 
governance over investor protection: see Tjio, supra note 162. 
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public shareholders’ lack of financial and informational resources.  To bridge that gap, 
further regulatory reform may be needed to equip shareholders of DCS companies with more 
means to call controller-insiders to account. Possible measures include further reducing the 
shareholding threshold for convening general meetings169 and strengthening statutory 
remedies for shareholders who have incurred losses as a result of material non-disclosure by 
the company or trading misconduct by insiders.170 A more radical step would be to vest in the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, as a public enforcement agency with the power to pursue 
civil actions when this is in the interests of the public.171 This could serve as a deterrent as 
well as redress for small minority shareholders without the wherewithal to mount legal suits.  
 
In all, the DCS listing regime proposed by SGX may be seen as a measured attempt at 
mediating the opposing demands of intense competition172 and legitimate governance 
concerns. In a sense, it is “inevitable”173 that Singapore would have to open its doors to DCS 
structures to be competitive, but an accompanying suite of exacting criteria and safeguards is 
put in place to avoid racing to the bottom. Excessive prudence may blunt the effectiveness of 
the new device, but a calibrated approach that can be fine-tuned over time makes sense when 




At a basic level, the debate on DCS structures may be pitched as a contest between the 
interests of investors and the profitability of demutualized stock exchanges. Historically, 
however, DCS structures have often been invoked to advance wider public or national 
 
169 CA § 176 currently provides that holders of at least 10% of a company’s total voting rights may requisition 
for a general meeting to be held. In the SGX Consultation Paper II, SGX contemplates modifying this threshold 
such that the requisite 10% is determined on a one-share-one-vote basis: see supra note 131, at Part III, para. 
2.1. But it is arguable this threshold could be further lowered to 5% given the increased risks of expropriation in 
DCS companies. 
170 HANS TJIO, WAI YEE WAN, HON YEE KWOK, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN 
SINGAPORE 75 – 76 ( 3rd ed, 2017).  
171 A similar suggestion (modelled after s 50 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 
(Cth)) had previously been made in the reform of Singapore’s insider trading laws (see CORPORATE FINANCE 
COMMITTEE, THE SECURITIES MARKET: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 29, Oct. 21, 1998) but was not adopted by 
the Government. 
172 Wei Han Wong, More Singapore Companies Consider Moving to Hong Kong Bourse, Straits Times, May 
15, 2017; Melissa Tan, Singapore Risks Fading into Investor Backwater as Market Cap Shrinks, Business 
Times, Jan. 4, 2016. 
173 R Sivanithy, Dual–class Shares: Issue Now is Striking the Balance, Business Times, Feb. 17, 2017. 
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policies.174 Thus, while the ideology of shareholder parity remains significant, it has not been 
and is not the sole determinant of regulatory policies. Rather, it is an important factor to be 
weighed against economic and social policies. In Singapore, the use of DCS structures has 
been advanced as one of multiple strategies for economic growth, and this serves as a heavy 
counterweight against shareholder governance concerns. Whether this strategy will turn out 
to be the winning bet remains to be seen, but, for now it would seem that the assumption of 
that risk is unavoidable. 
 
Postscript: 
Since the submission of this Article, the SGX has confirmed175 the listing framework for 






174 It has been observed, for example, that nationalist concerns of foreign ownership and domination of 
Canadian companies best explain the proliferation of DCS structures in Canada in the 1970s and their 
persistence to the present: see Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 66, 132 – 142. Ringe likewise argues that post-2008 
financial crisis, the use of multi-vote structures was expected to rise in Europe as a form of economic 
protectionism against the infiltration of Sovereign Wealth Funds from the middle east and far east: see supra 
note 87. 




176 The rules of the new framework may be accessed at 
http://rulebook.sgx.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/s/g/SGX_Mainboard_Rules_June_26_2018.pdf.  
